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Abstract
This article reviews three strands in the scholarship on the populist radical right (PRR). 
It covers both political parties and extra-parliamentary mobilization in contemporary 
European democracies. After definitional issues and case selection, the authors first 
discuss demand-side approaches to the fortunes of the PRR. Subsequently, supply-
side approaches are assessed, namely political opportunity explanations and internal 
supply-side factors, referring to leadership, organization and ideological positioning. 
Third, research on the consequences of the emergence and rise of these parties and 
movements is examined: do they constitute a corrective or a threat to democracy? The 
authors discuss the growing literature on the impact on established parties’ policies, 
the policies themselves, and citizens’ behaviour. The review concludes with future 
directions for theorizing and research.
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Introduction
Support for populist radical right (PRR) parties and movements has swelled in previous 
decades (Backes and Moreau, 2012). This has triggered extensive scholarly debate, 
which often focuses on electoral politics – for recent reviews on PRR parties, see Golder 
(2016), Greven (2016) and Mudde (2016).
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A strict division of labour seems to divide sociologists from political scientists, with 
each discipline focusing on the non-electoral and electoral channel, respectively (Rydgren, 
2007). Social movement protests have generally been dominated by ‘the left’, while ‘the 
right’ mainly uses the electoral channel to voice its discontent, instead of taking to the 
street (Hutter, 2014). Consequently, social movement scholars focus on egalitarian move-
ments that promote change, rather than reactionary movements (Hirsch-Hoefler and 
Mudde, 2013). They tend to overlook the most important contemporary actors mobilizing 
against the consequences of globalization and immigration: the populist radical right 
(Hutter and Kriesi, 2013). As Caiani et al. (2012: 4) put it: ‘social movement studies … 
[have] been slow to address the “bad side” of social movement activism’. Only when 
sociologists widen their perspective to the electoral channel, can we fully grasp the impli-
cations of globalization and large-scale immigration for political contention.
This article reviews the scholarship on both PRR parties and movements in contem-
porary European democracies. First, we discuss the definitional debate about what con-
stitutes the populist radical right (PRR) family. Second, we review demand-side and 
supply-side explanations for the fortunes of PRR parties and movements. Third, we dis-
cuss research on the consequences of the emergence and rise of PRR parties and move-
ments. The review concludes with a discussion of the future directions that theorizing 
and research could take.
Definitional debate on radical right-wing populism
Different labels such as ‘extreme right’ (Arzheimer, 2009; Bale, 2003; Lubbers et al., 
2002), ‘far right’ (Golder, 2016: Williams, 2010) and ‘populist radical right’ (Mudde, 
2007) are used interchangeably to refer to the same organizations, such as the French 
Front National (FN), Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) and Flemish Bloc/Flemish Interest 
(VB). A consensus has emerged that they constitute one single family.
The most important common denominator is their exclusionist, ethno-nationalist notion 
of citizenship, reflected in the slogan ‘own people first’ (Betz, 1994; Rydgren, 2005a). This 
nativist stance means that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native 
group (the nation) and that non-native elements (persons and ideas) threaten homogeneous 
nation-states (Mudde, 2007). The label ‘radical’ thus refers to the outspoken position at the 
far end of the political spectrum on issues related to immigration and ethnic diversity 
(Akkerman et al., 2016). Since they strongly hold issue-ownership over immigration issues 
(Abou-Chadi, 2016) some scholars simply refer to ‘anti-immigration parties’ (Van der 
Brug et al., 2005). This label however does not suit PRR parties and movements in Eastern 
Europe very well, since they are more rooted in territorial revisionism and perceived threats 
from ethnic minorities, such as the Roma (Bustikova and Kitschelt, 2009; Minkenberg, 
2017). Compared with Western Europe, the link between anti-immigration attitudes and 
PRR voting is significantly weaker in post-communist Europe (Allen, 2017).
According to Mudde’s (2007) influential definition, two additional features character-
ize the PRR family: populism and authoritarianism. PRR groups share their populist, 
anti-establishment rhetoric (Carter, 2005; Ivarsflaten, 2008; Pelinka, 2013). Populism is 
a communication style or ‘thin’ ideology that adds a second division between ‘us’ and 
‘them’: it pits the ‘pure people’ against the untrustworthy ‘corrupt elite’ (Mudde, 2007).
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Second, authoritarianism implies stressing themes like law and order and traditional 
values. Relatedly, PRR groups favour strong leaders who reflect ‘the will of the people’ 
(Inglehart and Norris, 2016). However, there seems no consistent empirical relationship 
between authoritarian attitudes and PRR party preference in Western Europe (Dunn, 
2015). Traits such as conformism or submission to traditional authority are also at odds 
with the picture painted of far-right social movement activists (Klandermans and Mayer, 
2006). As a matter of fact, PRR movements often challenge existing authority (Hirsch-
Hoefler and Mudde, 2013).
In a nutshell, substantial progress has been made in three respects. First, scholars have 
diverted their attention away from trivializing definitional debates about what right-wing 
radicalism or populism really ‘is’. Instead, they have increasingly focused on more 
informative discussions about theories and hypotheses. Second, scholars increasingly 
focus on actually measuring the ideological characteristics and policy stances of both 
PRR and mainstream parties (Eger and Valdez, 2015; Immerzeel et al., 2016; Rooduijn 
and Pauwels, 2011). As a corollary, most scholars have abandoned reasoning in clear-cut 
categories. A strict ‘either–or’ logic (Mudde, 2007; Van Kessel, 2015) has been replaced 
by the argument that populism is more a ‘matter of degree’ (Pauwels, 2011a). Likewise, 
parties can position themselves somewhere on the left–right or cosmopolitan–nativist 
dimension (Akkerman et al., 2016; Van Spanje, 2011a).
Nevertheless, for many research questions requiring case selection it is still necessary to 
delineate which ones deserve the label PRR and which ones not. Relying on expert sur-
veys, Van Spanje (2011a) for instance qualifies parties that score higher than 8 on a 10-point 
left–right scale (it is unclear what a position on this scale exactly signifies) and an immigra-
tion restriction scale as ‘far right’ and ‘anti-immigration’, respectively. Inglehart and Norris 
(2016) use a similar method with a cultural position scale, which includes promoting tradi-
tional values, nationalism, law and order, and opposition to multiculturalism.
Van Spanje (2011a: 295) noted that, despite conceptual unclarity, ‘every researcher 
seems to know which objects to study’. This however seems less obvious when we study 
post-communist Europe. Until recently, scholars have often ignored this region 
(Minkenberg, 2015, 2017; Pirro, 2015; Pytlas, 2016). Due to its more fluid party sys-
tems, it is generally more difficult to distinguish the political establishment from (popu-
list) outsiders challenging it (Van Kessel, 2015). Mainstream parties and discourses are 
often more radicalized than in Western Europe (Minkenberg, 2017). Particularly Law 
and Justice (PiS) in Poland and Fidesz in Hungary illustrate this difficulty. Minkenberg 
(2017: 124) considers them ‘right-wing populist with programmatic elements of radical 
right’, since they remain ideologically more diverse than the PRR family. Nevertheless, 
these two parties feature prominently in debates about liberal democracy being under-
mined by right-wing populism. Expert surveys show that PiS and Fidesz have more radi-
cal positions than some Western European PRR parties (Inglehart and Norris, 2016).
Explanations for failures and successes: Demand- and 
supply-side approaches
Explanations for the rise and fortunes of PRR parties and movements are usually grouped 
into two approaches, demand-side and supply-side: one focusing on grievances and one 
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on political constraints and opportunities (Koopmans et al., 2005; Mudde, 2007; Rydgren, 
2007). These two approaches should be viewed as complementary, rather than compet-
ing theories (Van der Brug and Fennema, 2007). Supply-side factors can be further 
divided into internal factors (De Lange and Art, 2011; Norris, 2005), like organizational 
characteristics (Art, 2011; De Witte and Klandermans, 2000), and external factors, such 
as institutional frameworks and elite responses (Arzheimer and Carter, 2006; Kitschelt 
and McGann, 1995).
The socio-demographic characteristics and attitudes of radical right supporters have 
been extensively investigated (Arzheimer, 2012; Golder, 2016; Van der Brug and 
Fennema, 2007). More recent studies also include Eastern European countries (Allen, 
2017; Inglehart and Norris, 2016; Werts et al., 2013). The findings can be summarized 
into two general claims. First, protest is not ‘unideological’, but clearly directed against 
policies concerning immigration, integration and law and order (Eatwell, 2000; 
Swyngedouw, 2001). Voting for PRR parties seems largely motivated by ideological and 
pragmatic considerations, just like voting for other parties (Van der Brug et al., 2000). 
These motivations stem from perceived loss of culture and economic deprivation, 
although citizens perhaps do not clearly distinguish between cultural and economic 
grievances (Golder, 2016). Moreover, characteristics of followers might differ across 
contexts. For instance, lower-educated people are generally the ‘usual suspects’, but the 
constituency of Jobbik certainly does not consist of the ‘losers’ of the transition: the 
young and higher educated are more likely to support this party (Kovács, 2013).
Alternatively, voters for PRR parties are sometimes characterized as irrational and 
alienated, seemingly unconnected to any particular values or policy preferences. 
However, social isolation is not related to PRR voting, either in Western or Eastern 
Europe (Rydgren, 2011; Zhirkov, 2014). In a similar vein, Klandermans and Mayer 
(2006: 267) conclude that radical right activists are socially integrated and appear as 
‘perfectly normal people’ (cf. Blee and Creasap, 2010: 271).
Second, it has become clear that a complete and satisfying explanation for PRR popu-
larity needs to go beyond the demand-side model. It fails to explain short-term fluctua-
tions within countries or large differences between otherwise mostly similar countries 
(Coffé, 2005; Norris, 2005). For instance, Austria, where the FPÖ has enjoyed consider-
able successes, is hardly more deprived than Germany, where the PRR is weak. Similarly, 
comparing the divergent fortunes of the Walloon Front National and Flemish VB, it is 
hard to imagine that immigration and unemployment have created significantly larger 
electoral demands for the radical right in Flanders compared to the Walloon region 
(Arzheimer, 2012).
The external supply-side: Political constraints and 
opportunities
According to external supply-side explanations, successful mobilization is the result of 
constraints and opportunities that the political-institutional context offers, most impor-
tantly the electoral system and the ‘political space’ left open by political competitors. 
Several researchers have convincingly shown that such factors matter, both for the action 
repertoire that PRR actors adopt (Koopmans et al., 2005) and their electoral performances 
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(Arzheimer, 2009; Arzheimer and Carter, 2006; Carter, 2005; Lubbers et al., 2002; Norris, 
2005; Van der Brug et al., 2005).
Institutional framework
Several works have assessed whether the level of federalism and the electoral system 
affect the popularity of the PRR (Carter, 2002; Hakhverdian and Koop, 2007; Swank and 
Betz, 2003; Veugelers and Magnan, 2005). According to Kitschelt (2007: 1193), the gen-
eral lesson is that the impact of institutional effects on PRR party strength is modest. 
Proportional electoral systems are conducive to the entrance or success of new parties 
(Tavits, 2006), but findings regarding radical parties in particular have been mixed 
(Carter, 2005; Golder, 2003; Jackman and Volpert, 1996; Norris, 2005; Van der Brug 
et al., 2005). Electoral thresholds may induce potential radical right voters to support 
mainstream parties when they perceive their favourite party to be too weak to overcome 
the barrier to entry (Givens, 2005). Clearly, the institutional configuration most unfa-
vourable for newcomers exists in Britain (Kitschelt, 2007). That the British PRR has 
‘failed’ is often attributed to the majoritarian electoral system (John and Margetts, 2009).
Political space
The emergence and rise of the PRR is affected by the positioning of the political parties 
within the policy space (Kitschelt and McGann, 1995). Political space refers to the 
degree to which mainstream parties (or moderate-right parties in particular) occupy the 
electoral terrain of the radical right. When they ideologically converge, they leave a ‘gap’ 
in the electoral market. Kriesi et al. (2008, 2012) argue that where established parties 
follow a moderate course in favour of the ‘winners’ of globalization, they provide an 
opportunity for the creation of parties that mobilize the ‘losers’. Several studies indeed 
found that ideological convergence between mainstream parties benefited the entrance or 
success of radical new parties (Arzheimer and Carter, 2006; Carter, 2005; Norris, 2005; 
but see Veugelers and Magnan, 2005).
We need to distinguish issue positions from issue salience. Mainstream parties have 
three strategies at their disposal: remain silent on the particular issue (dismissive), dis-
tance itself from nativist viewpoints (adversarial), or adopt a similar position (accom-
modative). Meguid (2008) argues that issue salience will only enhance PRR support if 
mainstream parties declare hostility toward the niche party’s policy position. If main-
stream parties employ accommodative tactics, electoral support for PRR contenders will 
diminish. Many scholars similarly argue that the PRR loses out when mainstream parties 
adopt restrictive positions on immigration (Arzheimer and Carter, 2006; Kitschelt and 
McGann, 1995). This strategy may however backfire (Bale, 2003). Eatwell (2000: 423) 
for instance notes that mainstream parties ‘play with fire’ when they adopt anti-immi-
grant themes, because it legitimizes the agenda of the PRR.
Political space is measured in different ways, for different time periods. Therefore, the 
results of studies on the effect of the political agenda of other parties on the popularity of 
PRR challengers show a mixed picture. For instance, using Eurobarometer surveys 
(1980–2002) and party statements on internationalism, multiculturalism, national 
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lifestyle and law and order from the Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP), Arzheimer 
(2009; see also Arzheimer and Carter, 2006) found that the ideological position of the 
established moderate-right party (labelled ‘toughness’) had no significant effect on 
cross-national differences in support for the PRR. On the other hand, saliency, the rela-
tive amount of these statements in the manifestos of all established parties, had a positive 
impact on levels of PRR support.
In contrast, Van der Brug et al. (2005) found that PRR parties are more successful 
when the moderate-right occupies a more centrist position on a general left–right scale. 
They relied on the European Elections Studies data (1989–1999) and used respondents’ 
perceptions to measure party positions. And in this case, the extent to which the anti-
immigration parties’ mainstream competitor emphasized the core issue of the radical 
right was insignificant, although they measured saliency similarly to Arzheimer (using 
the CMP data) by selecting the issues crime, negative references to multiculturalism and 
positive references to ‘the national way of life’.
The role of the media environment
The above-mentioned contradiction could perhaps be solved when we complement the 
political space approach with the notion that opportunities and constraints need to become 
publicly visible in order to become relevant (Koopmans and Olzak, 2004). Populist move-
ments rely heavily on media, because they often lack sufficient organizational and finan-
cial means to get their message across to potential adherents. The controversial, 
tabloid-style language of its leaders flourishes in a ‘media logic’ in which newsworthiness 
is increasingly based on conflicts and scandals (Aalberg et al., 2016; Castells, 1997).
Media-related independent variables can be grouped into (1) attention for issues asso-
ciated with the PRR and (2) attention for PRR actors. Regarding the first, the empirical 
findings indicate that news coverage on issues that are ‘owned’ by PRR parties – immi-
gration issues and law and order – enhances the electoral attractiveness of these parties 
(Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart, 2007; Plasser and Ulram, 2003; Walgrave and De 
Swert, 2004).
Several researchers have also investigated the effect of news coverage on PRR actors 
(Lubbers and Scheepers, 2001; Vliegenthart et al., 2012). There are many indications 
that the ‘media factor’ benefits PRR groups. For example, the French FN made its elec-
toral breakthrough in 1984 only after Jean-Marie Le Pen was given access to state televi-
sion (Eatwell, 2005; Ellinas, 2009). Another example is the ‘pro-Haider line’ of the 
Kronen Zeitung, Austria’s largest newspaper (Art, 2007).
Scholars have differentiated between coverage for PRR speakers and responses of 
other actors, between positive and negative coverage (Bos et al., 2010; Koopmans and 
Muis, 2009; Muis, 2015), and between the visibility of leaders and parties (Vliegenthart 
et al., 2012). Research shows that PRR leaders and parties clearly profit from media 
prominence (Bos et al., 2010; Clarke et al., 2016; Koopmans and Muis, 2009). 
Vliegenthart et al. (2012) find that party visibility enhanced electoral support for five of 
the six anti-immigrant parties they investigated, namely VB, Party for Freedom (PVV), 
Republikaner, National Democratic Party for Germany (NPD) and German People’s 
Union (DVU). The Dutch Centre Democrats (CD) was the one exception.
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Muis’s (2015) study on the CD showed two opposite effects: negative publicity was 
electorally harmful, but at the same time it increased media visibility. Support for the 
party decreased when it achieved media access because the outright racist claims of its 
leader Hans Janmaat provoked harsh criticism. But when trying to achieve media visibil-
ity, it turned out that ‘any publicity is good publicity’. This nuances the claim of Stewart 
et al. (2003) that any media coverage is advantageous for political figures: it enhances 
their visibility, but not necessarily implies public legitimation. The difficulty is thus to 
find the right balance between newsworthiness and electoral credibility. Populist leaders 
face a trade-off between ‘being somewhat unusual and provocative … (in order to guar-
antee newsworthiness and therefore prominence)’ and being ‘taken seriously as a party’ 
(Bos et al., 2010: 143).
Repression, cordon sanitaire
This brings us to the role of repression and legal measures, such as bans and prosecutions. 
A similar logic applies here: the effect of repression is conditional. Its effects may depend 
on the politician or group targeted and the situation they are in. Another relevant factor is 
the nature of the statements in question (Van Spanje and De Vreese, 2015). For instance, 
the hate-speech charges pressed on Geert Wilders in 2009 considerably boosted electoral 
support for his party (Van Spanje and De Vreese, 2015). Wilders had already established 
himself as a powerful politician when it was decided that he was to stand trial.
The impact of prosecution is very different for politicians and groups on the fringe. 
When movement activists are faced with legal and social sanctions (e.g. public disap-
proval and exclusion), protesting is a costly business and the ability to attract a wider 
support-base is undermined. Countries differ significantly in laws regulating the Internet, 
and thus how favourable a national context is for the online activities of radical right-
wing groups (Caiani and Parenti, 2013).
In addition to legal measures, PRR parties sometimes suffer political exclusion in the 
form of a refusal by other parties to cooperate with them, a so-called cordon sanitaire 
(Akkerman et al., 2016). It is however not clear whether it is an effective strategy if the 
purpose is to undermine electoral support. Results on the effects of exclusion on electoral 
outcomes of PRR parties are mixed (Pauwels, 2011b; Van Spanje and Van der Brug, 2009).
Internal supply-side factors: Characteristics of the PRR
From an internal supply-side perspective, we cannot reduce PRR parties and movements 
to the passive consequences of socio-economic processes and external political condi-
tions. Instead, they are largely shapers of their own fates (Carter, 2005; Goodwin, 2006; 
Ignazi, 2003; Mudde, 2007). We distinguish two factors: ideology and organizational 
structure, including leadership (Carter, 2005; Goodwin, 2006).
The role of ideology
What parties most importantly can achieve through their own actions is to find a benefi-
cial position in the policy space. Kitschelt and McGann (1995) claimed that the 
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ideological ‘winning formula’ combines culturally exclusionist/authoritarian positions 
with liberal pro-market positions. However, the position that is said to make the PRR 
successful has changed over time (De Lange, 2007; Kitschelt, 2004). The PRR has aban-
doned right-wing economic stances (Eger and Valdez, 2015) and adopted protectionism 
(Rydgren, 2013) and welfare chauvinism (Oesch, 2008).
Carter (2005) demonstrated a relation between the type of ideology parties employ 
and their success: more extreme parties are less successful. She encountered some nota-
ble exceptions. The Dutch CD was for instance a deviant case: most of the party’s ideo-
logical counterparts have flourished, like in Austria (FPÖ), France (FN) and Belgium 
(VB). The ideological character does not only have direct effects on the fortunes of par-
ties, it also interacts with other explanatory factors. Golder (2003) found that increasing 
unemployment and high levels of immigration only yield more electoral success for 
populist radical right parties, but not for the ones that were labelled as ‘neo-fascist’. 
Despite these two examples, to date, research on such interactions and ideological posi-
tioning is relatively scarce (Golder, 2016). Instead of figuring as an explanatory factor, 
party ideology has played a more dominant role in delimiting the dependent variable.
In any case, despite their common nativist stance as their unique selling point, PRR 
groups are distinct in their ideological character and framing, and these differences have 
crucial consequences in terms of their fortunes. The ‘master frame’ (combining nativism 
with populism) needs to be modified to the particular national context in which these 
groups operate (Caiani and Della Porta, 2011; Rydgren, 2005b). Scholars have observed 
that far-right orientations have been adapted. In particular, anti-Semitism has been 
replaced by Islamophobia (Williams, 2010). In Scandinavia and the Netherlands, ‘new’ 
PRR parties have stressed progressiveness – liberty, women’s rights, individualism – 
against reactionary authoritarian standpoints (De Koster et al., 2014; Rydgren, 2005b). 
In a similar vein, anti-Islam movements such as the English Defence League (EDL) and 
the Identitarian movement (France) have distanced themselves from anti-Semitism and 
racism (Fielitz and Laloire, 2016).
Organizational arguments and leadership
Besides ideology, organizational characteristics such as a lack of financial resources, 
appealing leadership and shortfall of active membership have frequently been proposed 
as pivotal factors for the performances of PRR parties and movements (Art, 2011). Lack 
of coherence of party organizations and intra-party conflicts have often hampered PRR 
parties (Heinisch and Mazzoleni, 2016).
However, organizational characteristics that are supposedly beneficial or indispensa-
ble often do not seem to be relevant in order to account for the impressive performance 
of populist challengers. As pointed out earlier, many leaders rely almost entirely on 
media attention, and successful trajectories often illustrate how media visibility can com-
pensate for organizational weaknesses (Ellinas, 2009; Mazzoleni, 2008). The growth of 
membership and improvement of an organization often lag behind success, instead of the 
other way around: media attention and electoral support are first successfully mobilized, 
then organizational and financial resources follow. In a review article on party organiza-
tion effects, Ellinas (2009: 219) states that organizational arguments ‘would need to 
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carefully trace the evolution of party organisations to establish the direction of causality’. 
His evidence from the French FN indicates that organizational growth seems the conse-
quence rather than the cause of electoral success, especially during the earlier stages of 
development. De Witte and Klandermans (2000) identified a ‘circle of organisational 
weakness’: weak organizations (like the Dutch CD) remained weak, whereas, in contrast, 
strong organizations (like VB in Belgium) became stronger over time. In sum, organiza-
tional resources seem often both a cause and a result of success. As a genuinely ‘inde-
pendent variable’, organizational strength might be more important to explain the 
persistence of parties after their initial breakthrough (Ellinas, 2007, 2009).
Charismatic leadership is another prominent supply-side explanation in the academic 
literature (Eatwell, 2005; Lubbers et al., 2002). However, this explanation suffers from 
circular reasoning (Van der Brug and Mughan, 2007; Van der Brug et al., 2005). Charisma 
is a legitimization for those who appear to be the ‘heroes of a war’ and can as suddenly 
vanish as it appears. If leaders are unsuccessful, charismatic authority can quickly disap-
pear. Max Weber (1947 [1921]) illustrates this by noting that even Chinese monarchs 
could sometimes lose their status as ‘sons of heaven’ because of misfortune, such as 
defeat in war, floods or drought. To conclude, outstanding charismatic appeal is better 
seen as an emergent situational characteristic, rather than attributed to the skills and per-
sonality of the leader concerned.
Consequences of PRR party and movement success
In addition to the causes of PRR fortunes, scholars have increasingly investigated the 
consequences of the emergence and rise of PRR parties and movements (Mudde, 2013; 
Rosanvallon, 2008). It is often stated that radical right populism endangers some of the 
constitutional foundations of liberal democracies: pluralism and the protection of minor-
ities (Abts and Rummens, 2007; Betz, 2004; Mudde, 2007).
At the same time, however, scholars agree that it distinguishes itself from political 
extremism, in the sense that PRR supporters and activists respect democracy, whereas 
extremist groups are hostile to democratic political processes (Betz and Johnson, 2004; 
Minkenberg, 2011; Rydgren, 2007). PRR parties could actually correct democratic defi-
ciencies by speaking to a large group of citizens disillusioned with mainstream politi-
cians (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2012). Citizens feel that there is someone who 
‘listened to their grievances’ (Ivarsflaten, 2008) and enables them to become passion-
ately, rather than rationally, involved in politics (Mouffe, 2005).
The question of whether there is a relationship between PRR successes and various 
outcomes associated with the quality of democracy (such as voter turnout) can be empiri-
cally tested (Immerzeel, 2015). Therefore, and related to the observation that the PRR 
has assumed more stable positions within the party system (De Lange, 2012; Zaslove, 
2008), we have witnessed a rise in studies on the impact of PRR success on several 
domains, including the party system (Mudde, 2014) and media debate (Rooduijn, 2014). 
We restrict ourselves here to the impact on policies, on PRR groups themselves and on 
the public. Studies generally focus on Western Europe; despite some exceptions, evi-
dence for the impact of the PRR is largely absent from the literature on the East European 
radical right (Minkenberg, 2017).
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Policies and mainstream party positions
Given the PRR’s alleged threatening effect on the position and rights of immigrants, it 
comes as no surprise that scholars have paid attention to the extent to which the PRR was 
successful in implementing policies derived from its nativist, anti-immigration ideology. 
Scholars have investigated whether governments that included PRR members introduced 
tougher policies on immigration and integration (Akkerman, 2012; Heinisch, 2003; 
Luther, 2011; Zaslove, 2004). These studies generally find no or a limited impact of the 
PRR on the policies implemented. For instance, Akkerman (2012) concludes on the basis 
of a comparative analysis of the immigration and integration output of 27 cabinets in 
nine countries (1996–2010) that when the PRR is in office, cabinets generally introduce 
stricter immigration and integration legislation than centre(-left) cabinets. Yet, centre-
right cabinets that do not include a PRR are similar in terms of strictness of immigration 
policy as those including a PRR. Apparently, the difficulties these parties face in adapt-
ing to public office hinder their effectiveness to implement stricter policies (Akkerman, 
2012; cf. Van Spanje, 2011b). The finding of Zaslove (2008) that the Austrian Freedom 
Party and Italian Lega Nord (LN) have been instrumental in passing more restrictive 
immigration policy may thus be more due to the performance of the conservative main-
stream parties that cooperate with them than because of the performance of the PRR 
itself (cf. Heinisch, 2003).
The PRR could also influence policy making indirectly, via its impact on other par-
ties’ positions (Schain, 2006). As such, scholars have investigated whether the PRR’s 
success influences the policy positions on immigration, multiculturalism, populism, law 
and order, and more style-related issues, such as anti-establishment rhetoric (Bale, 2003; 
Bale et al., 2010; Han, 2014; Immerzeel et al., 2016; Rooduijn et al., 2014; Van Spanje, 
2010; Williams, 2006). To study these effects, scholars used either expert surveys (e.g. 
Immerzeel, 2015; Van Spanje, 2010), or assessed the salience of typical PRR issues in 
party manifestos (e.g. Alonso and Da Fonseca, 2012).
The results of these studies can be easily summarized: the PRR affects the stances of 
mainstream parties on immigration and integration issues, but not on other issues. Based on 
various expert surveys, Van Spanje (2010) concluded that other political parties have gener-
ally become more restrictive with respect to immigration and integration due to the PRR’s 
success. Using manifesto data, Han (2014) and Akkerman (2015) found similar effects. 
More specifically, a fine-grained manifesto content analysis (1989–2011) by Akkerman 
(2015) shows that mainly Liberals were tempted to co-opt far-right positions, whereas 
Social Democrats are not affected – or at least their reaction is far from uniform (Bale et al., 
2010). Han (2014: 1) shows that left-wing parties only become less multicultural ‘when the 
opinion of party supporters on foreigners becomes more negative or when the parties lost 
more votes in the previous election than their opponent right-wing mainstream parties did’.
With regard to other issues, such as populism and law and order, mainstream parties 
seem to hold to their original ideological position (Bale et al., 2010). On the basis of 
manifesto data (Rooduijn et al., 2014) and expert surveys (Immerzeel et al., 2016), schol-
ars do not find that mainstream parties have become more populist and authoritarian.
To conclude, PRRs have an indirect, but modest influence on policy outcomes. This 
impact is generally limited to the issue of immigration and integration (Mudde, 2013). 
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Specifically mainstream right-wing parties employ a convergence strategy that puts 
them ideologically closer to the PRR (Meguid, 2008; Williams, 2006). However, main-
stream right parties are often inclined to move toward stricter immigration policy any-
way, independently of PRR successes (Akkerman, 2015; Alonso and Da Fonseca, 2012; 
Bale, 2003).
Consequence for PRR parties/movements
There is a growing scholarship on how PRR successes affect these groups themselves. 
Most importantly, what effect does the inclusion into a governing coalition have on par-
ties, both in terms of their ideological positions and their electoral success (Akkerman 
and De Lange, 2012; Akkerman et al., 2016; Albertazzi and McDonnell, 2015; Van 
Spanje, 2011b)? Heinisch (2003) argued that right-wing populist parties thrive in opposi-
tion, but have trouble with actually participating in a government. He argued that govern-
ing leads to moderation and hence to electoral losses. In contrast, Mudde (2013) argues 
that they will uphold their oppositional image and radical rhetoric, to avoid the risk of 
being perceived as part of ‘the corrupt elite’.
Although there are several case studies, systematic tests of the so-called inclusion-
moderation thesis are scarce (Akkerman et al., 2016). Albertazzi and McDonnell (2010, 
2015) dismiss the received wisdom that populist parties have inherent problems with 
assuming power. Their case studies of three parties in Italy and Switzerland – Popolo 
della Libertà (PDL), LN and Schweizerische Volkspartei (SVP) – show that PRR parties 
can keep ‘one foot in and one foot out’ of government: they can thrive and maintain radi-
cal positions after taking up government responsibility (cf. Frölich-Steffen and 
Rensmann, 2007). Likewise, an extensive recent study of Akkerman et al. (2016) con-
cludes that there is no trend toward mainstreaming of Western European PRR parties 
when it comes to positions on their core issues immigration and integration, European 
integration and authoritarianism. Overall, there is thus no indication that PRR parties are 
becoming less radical.
Citizens’ attitudes and behaviour
Third, the PRR’s emergence and success might affect citizens, in the sense that they 
shift their views toward more anti-immigration and authoritarian positions, or change 
their political behaviour (Andersen and Evans, 2003; Bohman, 2011; Dunn and Singh, 
2011; Immerzeel, 2015; Ivarsflaten, 2005; Semyonov et al., 2006; Sprague-Jones, 2011; 
Wilkes et al., 2007). PRR groups can also make some issues more salient (Bale, 2003; 
Ivarsflaten, 2005).
Studies on the impact of PRR success on immigration attitudes provide a mixed pic-
ture (Dunn and Singh, 2011; Semyonov et al., 2006; Sprague-Jones, 2011). Some con-
clude that successful and visible PRR parties undermine support for multiculturalism 
(Bohman, 2011), whereas others find no effects. An extensive recent study, based on 
European Social Survey data (2002–2012), showed that PRR parties have not driven 
anti-immigration attitudes in Europe (Bohman and Hjerm, 2016). The main difficulty is 
the lack of longitudinal studies, modelling the attitudinal consequences of PRR success 
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over time. Evidence based on German and Dutch panel data showed that perceptions of 
threatened group interests precipitate rather than follow citizens’ preferences for PRR 
parties (Berning and Schlueter, 2016).
Regarding political involvement and trust, one might expect that PRR parties foster 
voter turnout because they reintroduce electoral competition and trigger politically dis-
engaged people to become actively or passionately involved in politics (Jansen, 2011; 
Mouffe, 2005). For instance, Fallend (2012) concludes that the Austrian FPÖ addressed 
issues neglected by other parties, such as immigration and integration. Accordingly, over 
the period 1996–2001, the party gave voice to an apolitical part of the electorate, who 
increasingly felt that politicians listened to them.
However, based on a Dutch six-wave panel study (2008–2013), Rooduijn et al. (2016) 
find that the popularity of populist parties fuels political discontent, rather than dampens 
it. In the same vein, based on an analysis of 33 European countries in the period 2002–
2012, Immerzeel and Pickup (2015) find there is no general positive influence of the 
PRR’s popularity on electoral turnout. Yet, the Western European PRR encourages some 
social groups to turn out for national elections. These groups are, however, people who 
are actually repelled by them: the more highly educated and politically interested are 
more inclined to ‘keep the rascals out’. To conclude, to speak of the PRR as ‘corrective 
of democracy’ seems – in terms of increasing electoral turnout or political satisfaction – a 
misunderstanding.
Another interesting question is how institutionalized and non-institutionalized forms 
of political participation are related. Hutter (2014) finds that the more successful the 
populist radical right is in electoral terms, the more it tends to abstain from protest activi-
ties. Furthermore, Koopmans’ (1996) cross-national comparison showed an inverse rela-
tion between the success of PRR parties and the incidence of racist violence. Access to 
political power in a number of Western European countries over the past years might 
have contributed to less right-wing violence (Ravndal, 2016). Hence, the electoral chan-
nel seems to effectively substitute for street activity and violence (see Koopmans et al., 
2005). However, a recent study comparing the German Bundesländer found a positive 
relation between PRR voting and xenophobic violence (Jäckle and König, 2017).
Particularly in the United Kingdom and Germany, xenophobic sentiments can hardly be 
canalized through the electoral channel. It therefore should perhaps not come as a surprise 
that both countries have experiences with large-scale street movements. The rise of EDL and 
Britain First is a corollary of the decay of the British National Party (Alessio and Meredith, 
2014; Allen, 2014). The EDL ‘offered a more attractive and confrontational alternative to 
perennial failure at the ballot box’ (Ford and Goodwin, 2014: 8). The movement relied heav-
ily on social media to get its message across and recruit supporters (Busher, 2013).
In sum, a weak or fragmented party sector corresponds with a strong movement sector 
or environment of violence (Minkenberg, 2011). It remains to be seen whether UKIP (in 
the UK) and Alternative for Germany (AfD) will change this picture in the future. Patzelt 
and Klose (2016) conclude that the number of Pegida protesters has shrunk since the AfD 
has increasingly succeeded to put their grievances on the political agenda. Although 
several AfD politicians have distanced themselves from Pegida (Geiges et al., 2015), a 
survey showed that 57% of the Pegida demonstrators in Dresden would vote for AfD, 
and only about 4–5% for NPD (Reuband, 2015).
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Future directions: How to proceed?
We conclude this review with a discussion of possible avenues for future research. 
Concerning research questions, scholars need to pay more attention to the temporal 
dimension of political contention (Golder, 2016). Remarkably, whereas cross-national 
comparisons have become commonplace, comparisons in time are still scarce (Ellinas, 
2007; Kitschelt, 2007). A dynamic view could reveal whether explanations for and con-
sequences of PRR parties and movements change during their trajectory. For instance, 
before groups pass the ‘threshold of relevance’ (Carter, 2005; Ellinas, 2007) – i.e. are big 
enough to matter – organizational attributes might have no effect on their performance. 
And once populist outsiders have established themselves as credible alternatives, tradi-
tional parties may not win back electoral support if they adopt similar agendas (Van 
Kessel, 2015). Likewise, the impact of government responsibility depends on how long 
parties exist and whether they have institutionalized (De Lange and Art, 2011).
Cross-national comparisons focus mainly on the PRR’s electoral strength. The 
strength of social movements and the interaction between electoral politics and other 
forms of political mobilization, including street protests and racist violence, have 
received relatively little attention. There are only a few comparative overviews of the 
non-party sector (Minkenberg, 2011). Individual-level research is needed on the question 
whether the electoral channel effectively substitutes for street activity (Hutter, 2014; 
Koopmans, 1996). To what extent do people refrain from using non-parliamentary means 
to voice their grievances about multiculturalism and immigration, due to electoral suc-
cesses or government inclusion of PRR parties (Minkenberg, 2011)? Again, a dynamic 
perspective is important: over time, movements can turn into political parties, and parties 
can engage in street demonstrations when they face political obstruction.
This brings us to future avenues for theoretical progress. Both PRR parties and move-
ments and its competitors/opponents can adjust their action repertoire and ideology over 
time, and continually respond to what other agents are doing, which is insufficiently 
addressed by static, spatial comparisons. Future scholarship could theorize more from 
such an evolutionary perspective. We should elaborate more sophisticated behavioural 
models of party strategies (Kitschelt, 2007). We should not only try to identify a certain 
policy package that ‘works’ beneficially. In addition, we need to reveal the mechanism 
by which parties are able or inclined to arrive at successful positions over time. Only a 
few accounts of far-right populism clearly explicate why or how successful populist 
leaders are able to find ‘successful positions’ and why most other attempts fail to do so 
(Muis and Scholte, 2013).
In terms of confronting theories with empirical evidence, future studies could be 
enriched by greater attention to PRR parties and movements’ presence on the Internet. 
The current debate on the role of the Internet is characterized by much theoretical specu-
lation; we know little about how these groups use the Internet for political communica-
tion and mobilization (Caiani and Parenti, 2013). Future work in this field could make 
progress in two ways. To date, to assess where PRR groups stand, scholars mainly rely 
on manifestos (Akkerman et al., 2016; Eger and Valdez, 2015), expert surveys (Immerzeel 
et al., 2016) and traditional media (Kriesi et al., 2008). These methods could be supple-
mented with sources that are widely consumed by citizens (few people actually read 
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party manifestos) and controlled by PRR actors themselves (media coverage might be 
biased), namely social media. Second, social media analyses could also enrich our under-
standing of supporters and sympathizers, in addition to surveys or interviews. For 
instance, Arzheimer (2015) concludes that the German AfD does not qualify as either 
nativist or populist, but statements of Facebook followers hint at more radical currents 
among its supporters. The topics that people devoted most attention to (Islam and immi-
gration) were hardly mentioned in AfD’s own messages.
To conclude, the scholarship on the populist radical right has become a ‘minor indus-
try’ (Arzheimer, 2012: 35), but there are still important gaps and challenges. In addition 
to the ample static country-comparisons, upcoming studies could pay more attention to 
the fact that both PRR actors and its environment are dynamic over time. They could also 
make progress by thereby investigating the interplay between the electoral channel and 
all other types of political mobilization, such as demonstrations. Since the stances and 
supporters of street movements are difficult to investigate with conventional methods 
such as surveys and manifesto coding, scholars could rely more on social media data.
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Résumé
Cet article examine trois tendances qui coexistent au sein des travaux de recherche 
sur la droite radicale et populiste. Il se penche sur les partis politiques et la mobilisation 
extraparlementaire dans les démocraties européennes contemporaines. Après avoir 
passé en revue les questions de définition et sélectionné plusieurs cas d’études, nous 
examinons les différentes approches de la demande qui expliquent les succès et les 
échecs de la droite populiste et radicale. Nous analysons ensuite les perspectives du 
côté de l’offre afin de souligner l’importance des opportunités politiques et des stratégies 
internes du côté de l’offre, c’est-à-dire le rôle de l’équipe dirigeante, de l’organisation 
et du positionnement idéologique. En troisième lieu, nous examinons les travaux de 
recherche sur l’émergence et la montée de ces partis et de ces mouvements en nous 
demandant s’ils représentent une remédiation ou une menace pour la démocratie. 
Nous analysons les travaux abondants consacrés aux conséquences de ce phénomène 
sur les politiques des partis, l’action publique et les comportements des citoyens et des 
appareils politiques. En conclusion, cette étude propose de nouvelles pistes pour les 
travaux de théorisation et de recherche.
Mots-clés
Partis anti-immigration, populisme, droite radicale, extrême droite, mouvements 
sociaux
Resumen
Este artículo revisa tres aspectos de los estudios sobre la derecha radical populista 
(PRR), abarcando tanto los partidos políticos como la movilización extraparlamentaria 
en las democracias europeas contemporáneas. Luego de presentar los temas de 
definición y la selección de casos, primero debatimos los enfoques del lado de la 
demanda para las fortunas del PRR. Posteriormente, evaluamos los enfoques de la 
oferta. Estos consisten en explicaciones de oportunidad política y enfoques internos 
de oferta, refiriéndose al liderazgo, la organización y el posicionamiento ideológico. 
En tercer lugar, se examina la investigación sobre las consecuencias de la aparición y 
el surgimiento de estos partidos y movimientos: ¿constituyen una corrección o una 
amenaza para la democracia? Discutimos la creciente literatura sobre el impacto en las 
políticas de los partidos establecidos, las políticas, ellos mismos y el comportamiento 
de los ciudadanos. La revisión concluye con las orientaciones futuras para la teorización 
y la investigación.
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sociales
